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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse or annul the final judgment and
conviction rendered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah in this
domestic case. Pursuant to Rule 3 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Section 78-2a-2(i),
Utah Code Annotated.

n.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in imputing full-time employment income to
the defendant in the amount of $1,019.00 per month, based on a 40 hour week, when defendant
testified that full time at her longest waitressing job held was 20 hours, and when the parties,
children needed her during said waitressing hours.

Standard of review is whether or not the

Trial Court abused its discretion.
Hall v. Hall. 10 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, August 10, 1993;
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.5.
2. Whether it was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion for the Court to award
defendant alimony in the amount of $100.00 per month. The standard of review in alimony
cases is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
English v. English. 565 P. 2d. at 411 (Utah 1977).
3. Whether the Court abused its discretion by not including in plaintiffs monthly income
(for purposes of computing child support and alimony) the contributions by his employer into
his retirement account in the approximate amount of 27% of his yearly and/or monthly income.
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion.

Muir v. Muir. 841 P. 2d. 736 (Utah Ct. App., 1992).
4. Whether the Court abused its discretion by allowing the plaintiff to deduct from the
total retirement balance the loan amount of $11,365.22 (which amount he was ordered to assume
and pay as part of the marital debts of the marriage) in granting defendant one-half (1/2) the
retirement account in her Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The standard of review for
valuation of retirement account is if the court abused its discretion.
Warren v. Warren, 655 P. 2d 784 (Utah, 1982);
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5.
5. Whether the Court abused its discretion by refusing to award any attorney fees to the
defendant in this divorce action. The standard of review is abuse of discretion.
Huck v. Huck. 734 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1986).
DL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a civil appeal of the Amended Decree of Divorce herein, entered July 13, 1993.
B. Course of Proceedings
On June 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce.
On October 3, 1992, defendant filed her Answer and Counter-Claim.
On October 27, 1992, the parties appeared before Commissioner Michael S. Evans for
an Order to Show Cause Hearing and the Order on Order to Show Cause was entered December
10, 1992.
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On June 11, 1993 and June 14, 1993, the trial of this divorce was held before the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third District Court Judge.
On July 13, 1993, the Amended Decree of Divorce was entered by the Court.
On July 16, 1993, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
C. Disposition at Trial Court
The full and inclusive disposition is as set forth in the Amended Decree of Divorce,
entered July 13, 1993.
IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff DENNIS LEON METCALF and defendant ARLENE ANN METC ALF were
married on February 10, 1976, and were separated on June 5, 1992.
2. Two (2) children were born to this marriage, to wit: STEVEN, born April 5, 1978;
and JEREMY, bom December 1, 1980.
3. On June 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce.
4. At the time the Decree was entered, plaintiff had been steadily employed with Central
Valley Water Reclamation for approximately thirteen (13) years (R31, L20), with a monthly
income of $2,231.00. Defendant had only had about a 18 months of work experience during
said seventeen (17) years of marriage, and she has no post-tenth grade education (R6, Ll-5)
and/or training for a job. Defendant was laid off from Holiday Inn where she was making
approximately $600.00 per month. In or about November 1992, defendant went on Public
Assistance, through the State of Utah.
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7.

Since June 5, 1992, defendant has had the physical custody of the parties' two

children, STEVEN and JEREMY. Pursuant to the Order on Order to Show Cause, the plaintiff
was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $404.00 per month, and alimony to the
defendant in the amount of $460.00 per month, which figures were computed using the
plaintiffs monthly figure of $2,200.00 and the defendant's imputed income of $583.00.
8. While the divorce was pending for about one year the defendant experienced problems
finding employment and did apply for seven (7) jobs during that time (Defendant's Exhibit 2).
She was employed as a waitress at The Shed (R4, L19-24), but because she broke her ankle in
February 1993, she was replaced at that position. She worked for the Delta Center during the
Jazz games (R4, L22-24). Her job-seeking was hindered by the time she had to be home to get
her two children off to school, by a vehicle transportation problem in that her 1985 Monte Carlo
had 146,000 miles on it and required repairs; i.e., at the time of trial it had a steering wheel
which was falling off, needed tires, new transmission and had a broken windshield (R14, L1216); and because the defendant's oldest son, STEVEN, was having gang problems at school and
defendant had to transfer him to another school, which necessitated defendant driving him to and
from school and being available for that time period (R15, Ll-25, R16, Ll-2).
8.

Defendant's monthly living expenses are approximately $1,776.67 (Defendant's

Exhibit 3), which includes a $50.00 per month property tax payment (R18, L17-22), and a
homeowner's insurance cost of about $35 per month (R19, L4-7).
9. At all times since December 1, 1992, plaintiff could afford to, and did, pay the
monthly support and alimony to defendant and also paid $50 per month on his own attorney fees.
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10. The plaintiff acquired retirement benefits through his employment at Central Valley
Water Reclamation Facility during this marriage. His employer contributed approximately 27%
of his gross yearly income into said retirement account (R46, Ll-4). At the time of trial, the
balance in the retirement account was $67,399.15 (R48, LI).
11. During this marriage, the parties had borrowed $20,000.00 between 1990 and 1992
on the retirement balance, of which about $11,000.00 was still owing at the time of the trial
(R48, L9-10). The monthly payments of $368.00 (R49, L2-4) was re-paying that said balance
on the loan taken from the retirement account (R49, L2-4).
12. The loan from said retirement was taken out and used for the purchase of the
following items which were awarded to plaintiff: a truck (at least $1,000.00) (R38, L16-18); the
trailer in which the plaintiff resides ($2,000.00) (R53, L16), and a Rotweiller which plaintiff has
($800.00) (R35, L23; R36, L4).
13.

At the time of trial, the total of plaintiffs monthly expenses was $1,527.00

(including $402.00 child support). His net disposable income was $707.70.
14. For purposes of determining child support, the Court used the monthly gross income
of $2,231.00 for plaintiff and imputed income to defendant in the amount of $1,019.00.
15. Defendant incurred attorney fees in this pursuit of this divorce, which were testified
to and reasonableness accepted by plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $1,710.50 (Defendant's
Exhibit 5). The plaintiff did not have the funds with which to pay said attorney fees (R24, L2932).
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V.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court incorrectly fixed the amount and abused its discretion by imputing to defendant
a 40-hour work week at her (longest) job of 1-1/2 years (in a 17-year marriage). Said position
was actually a 20-hour work week (which was considered "fulltime1'at Holiday Inn) (R30, L2123) and income was imputed by multiplying the 20-hour work week by 2 to arrive at a 40-hour
week and his "full-time" imputed income. (2R12, L9-25), (R13, L10). Instead, the Court should
have imputed minimum wage of $731.00 because plaintiff had been laid off from Holiday Inn
and she had no other employment history.
There is no question that the defendant herein is entitled to alimony in that she cannot
meet her monthly expenses of $1,691.00, even if she were employed making $680.00 per month
and was receiving child support of $402.00 per month. The plaintiff is able to provide to her
the sum of $550.00 per month alimony, based on the fact that after having paid all of his
monthly expenses he will have $714.58 per month free and clear with which to pay alimony.
Therefore, the Court clearly abused its discretion in only awarding alimony to the defendant in
the amount of $100.00 per month.
The Court herein would not consider that plaintiffs employer contributes 27% of his
gross monthly salary into a retirement account for plaintiffs future benefit. Said amount should
have been considered in determining plaintiffs monthly gross income to determine child support
and alimony amounts, thus increasing the child support and alimony amounts which were
ordered.
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The Trial Court should have awarded defendant one-half of the total of plaintiffs
retirement account, not deducting the loan amount of approximately $11,000.00. The loan
amount should not have been deducted since plaintiff kept some of the assets which were
purchased from said loan and the loan amount was calculated into his ability to pay alimony and
also calculated into the property distribution herein.
The Trial Court clearly erred by failing to award attorney fees in this case where the
defendant was on public assistance, had not had regular income for a period of approximately
one year, and could not afford to pay her own attorney's fees. In addition, plaintiff clearly had
the ability to pay those fees and should have been ordered to pay those fees in the amount of
$1,710.00.
VL
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FIXED THE AMOUNT OF
INCOME TO IMPUTE TO DEFENDANT
Section 78-45-7.5 (7)(b)(1992), Utah Code Annotated, sets forth that "if income is
imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.M

The only evidence before the Court regarding

defendant's work history was that she worked for Holiday Inn for 18 months (R12, L18-21)
working 20 hours per week, which was considered "full-time" at Holiday Inn (R30, L21-23),
making $2.80 per hour and approximately $100 per week in tips (R30, L17-23).
Notwithstanding that there was no other evidence presented to the Court regarding waitress'
hours in this community; i.e., being 20 hours "full-time" or 40 hours "full-time," the Trial
7

Court simply doubled the 20-hour income for the defendant and imputed a 40-hour work week.
The Trial Court speculated that defendant could make $125 per week tips and a salary of $112
per week and imputed income to defendant of $1,019 per month. There was no basis or
evidence on which to impute such full time employment to the defendant; i.e., "prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community" as required by §(7)(b).
In Hall v. Hall. 219 UAR 29 (Utah Court of Appeals, August 10, 1993), the Court
remanded the case to the Trial Court to evaluate the employment market for programmers in
general, and then to make its best effort to adjust for this appellant's unique skills. The Hall
Court, as herein, made no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning "prevailing earnings for
persons of similar backgrounds in the community." Id* at 32,
IT WAS A CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION
FOR THE COURT TO ONLY AWARD ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT
OF $100.00 PER MONTH
In Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d. 647, 649 (Utah 1988), the Utah Court set forth the factors
in setting alimony as:
a. The financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
b. The recipient's ability to produce income; and
c. The ability of the payor spouse to provide support.
The defendant's monthly expenses are $1,691.67 (R16, L9-24). She has only limited
work history making $680.00 per month, no post-tenth grade education or training, and has been
on Public Assistance during the pendency of the Divorce.
The plaintiff testified that his income was $2,231.26 per month (R45, L8-13). His actual
net income after taxes ($254) (Defendant's Exhibit 7) and the $368.00 monthly retirement loan
8

repayment (Defendant's Exhibit 7, page 2) is $1,609.26. After paying his $402.56 child
support, his $81 in debts (Defendant's Exhibit 7, page 2) and his $420 living expenses
(Defendant's Exhibit 7, page 3), plaintiff has $705.70 disposable income available for payment
of alimony herein.
The Trial Court made the following miscalculations which directly impacted the alimony
award.
(1) Found that after deducting only child support and taxes the plaintiff would have $900
"discretionary income that he could take care of things that he needs to take care o f

(2R18,

L8-13).
This is clearly incorrect. If only child support ($402.56) and taxes ($254) were deducted
from plaintiffs monthly gross income of $2231.26, the amount would be $1574.70
"discretionary income".
(2) It deducted plaintiffs $360 loan (the $368.00 retirement loan) from that $900
"discretionary income" and determined that plaintiff would have $550 a month left over to meet
his expenses (2R19, L17-23).
This is clearly incorrect. If we take plaintiffs true $1,574.70 "discretionary income" and
deduct the $368.00 retirement loan payment, he has $1206.70 left over.
(3) It determined that plaintiff would have less than $348 to live on (2R20, L2-7).
This is clearly incorrect. Plaintiff will have the $1,206.70 left over for living expenses.
After paying his living expenses of $81 (Defendant's Exhibit 7: page 2: $50 to Oral Health
Center and $31 to RC Willey) plus the $420 monthly living expenses (Defendant's Exhibit 7;
page 3), plaintiff will still have $705.70 free and clear with which to pay alimony.
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The Court in English v. English. 565 P.2d. at 411, set forth that the "ultimate test of the
propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of the factors, the party receiving alimony
will be able to support him/herself as nearly as possible at the standard of living . . . enjoyed
during marriage." It is obvious that with $100 per month alimony, $670 in wages and child
support of $402, for a total of $1,072 per month, defendant's income will fall short of her
monthly expenses by at least $600. While this case was pending in the Trial Court, defendant
did find it necessary to seek public assistance. It is now quite probable that she will have to
seek public assistance again. The Utah Courts have recognized that one purpose of alimony is
to "prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge," and there is now a high likelihood of
this. Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d. 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT INCLUDING IN
PLAINTIFF'S MONTHLY INCOME THE CONTRIBUTIONS BY HIS EMPLOYER
INTO HIS RETIREMENT ACCOUNT, FOR PURPOSES OF COMPUTING CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5 et al. sets forth that child support shall be based on
income derived from all sources. The Supreme Court of Utah has expounded on what can be
considered "income" in Naylor v. Naylor. 700 P.2d. 707 (Utah 1985), and set forth that the
Court may consider corporate benefits such as pension contributions made by employers. The
Court of Appeals in Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d. 736 (Utah App. 1992), held that any expenses paid
by the corporation, such as pension contributions, should be added to the stated salary of the exhusband. Id. at 739.
Plaintiff in this case testified that his employer (at no cost to him) contributed 27% of
his gross monthly salary into a retirement account for his future benefit (R46, Ll-4). This 27%
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should have been included in plaintiffs monthly gross income to determine child support and
alimony amounts herein. In addition, because of this retirement plan there is no FICA withheld
from plaintiffs pay checks (R49, L19-25), another direct benefit to him.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REDUCING THE PLAINTIFF'S RETIREMENT
BALANCE BY THE LOAN AMOUNT OF $11,365.22, ONLY GRANTING THE
DEFENDANT ONE-HALF THE NET RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
The Trial Court had discretion to divide the parties' property under Utah Code Ann. §303-5, but that discretion was abused. The Court in Warren v. Warren. 654 P.2d. 684 (Utah
1982), held that the party who incurred certain credit card liabilities for her own benefit should
bear the responsibility for such liabilities. It was testified to by the plaintiff herein that of the
retirement balance of the loan, expenditures for that loan had been as follows: a trailer in
plaintiffs possession (R33, L9-11), with a cost of $2,000; $800 for a Rottweiller dog (R57,
L18-19), which plaintiff kept; a truck (R38, L16-18); and a 1969 Ford truck (R50, L17-20) for
at least $1,000. All of these amounts should have been paid directly by the plaintiff and not
deducted from the retirement amount which defendant was awarded in her Qualified Domestic
Relations Order.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING
ANY ATTORNEY FEES TO DEFENDANT HEREIN
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) provides that either party to a divorce action may be
ordered to pay the attorney fees of the party in need. It is clear by the aforestated monthly
expenses of $1,666 per month and defendant's ability to meet those monthly expenses being
short by at least $550, that defendant is in need of an award for attorney fees for pursuit of her
divorce action. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has been employed for 12 years and has
11

monthly net disposable income of $1,206.70 with which to pay defendant's attorney fees herein.
The Utah Supreme Court found that the Trial Court had unreasonably failed to award attorney
fees in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d. 417 (Utah 1986). In this case the wife had income which
barely covered her monthly expenses and the Court held that she should at least receive one-third
of her attorney fees. Defendant herein has no income, and even if income was imputed to her
of approximately $600 per month, she could not afford to pay her attorney fees based on her
monthly expenses far exceeding her imputed income (even with child support and alimony
award).
It was clear by the evidence that defendant did not have the funds to pay her attorney fees
(R24, L12-21), which attorney fees were contained in exhibit 5, in the amount of $1,710. This
amount was accepted by opposing counsel as being reasonable and necessary attorney fees (R25,
Lll-16).
The Court incorrectly fixed the amount and abused its discretion by imputing to defendant
a 40-hour work week at her (longest) job of 1-1/2 years (in a 17-year marriage). Said position
was actually a 20-hour work week (which was considered "full time" at Holiday Inn) (R30, L2123) and income was imputed by multiplying the 20-hour work week by 2 to arrive at a 40-hour
week and his "full-time" imputed income. (2R12, L9-25), (R13, L10). Instead, the Court should
have imputed minimum wage of $731.00 because plaintiff had been laid off from Holiday Inn
and she had no other employment history.
There is no question that the defendant herein is entitled to more than $100.00 alimony,
since she cannot meet her monthly expenses of $1,691.00, even if she were employed making
$680.00 per month, was receiving child support of $402.00 per month and the $100.00 alimony.
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The plaintiff is able to provide to her the sum of $550.00 per month alimony, based on the fact
that after having paid aU of his monthly expenses he will have $705.70 per month free and clear
with which to pay alimony. Therefore, under all alimony factors contained in the Davis case,
the Court clearly abused its discretion in only awarding alimony to the defendant in the amount
of $100.00 per month.
The Court herein would not consider that plaintiffs employer contributes 27% of his
gross monthly salary into a retirement account for plaintiffs future benefit. The Muir Court
held that said amount should have been considered in determining plaintiffs monthly gross
income, to determine child support and alimony amounts, thus increasing the child support and
alimony amounts which were ordered.
The Trial Court should have awarded defendant one-half of the total of plaintiffs
retirement account, not deducting the loan amount of approximately $11,000.00. The loan
amount should not have been deducted since plaintiff kept some of the assets which were
purchased from said loan and the loan amount was calculated into his ability to pay alimony and
also calculated into the property distribution herein.
The Trial Court clearly erred by failing to award attorney fees in this case where the
defendant was on public assistance, had not had regular income for a period of approximately
one year, and could not afford to pay her own attorney's fees. In addition, plaintiff clearly had
the ability to pay those fees and should have been ordered to pay those fees in the amount of
$1,710.00.
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vn.
CONCLUSION
Defendant seeks the following relief:
1. A recomputed and increased child support award, taking into consideration plaintiffs
employer's retirement contribution of 27% of his wages;
2. A reversal of the Trial Court's alimony award of $100.00 per month and reinstate it
with the sum of $550.00, retroactive to July 13, 1993;
3. Issuance of an Order increasing defendant's share of plaintiffs retirement at Central
Valley Reclamation by $5,500;00;
4. A reversal of the Trial Court's award of no attorney fees to defendant and reinstate
with the sum of $1,700.00;
5. An award of costs of this Appeal and attorney fees incurred for this Appeal to
defendant and payable by plaintiff to defendant in an amount to be submitted to this Court after
its Decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^/_ day of October, 1993.

*^/7

Vf

Laura L. Boyer
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM
1. Amended Decree of Divorce and Judgment

ju*r^
FILED WSTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

ML 12 1993
WALKER E. ANDERSON UTAH STATE BAR #113
Mountain America Credit Union Building
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363 6426
Telcopier: (801) 322 3904
Attorney for Plaintiff

By

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS LEON METCALF,

AMENDED

DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ARLENE ANN METCALF and
the STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant.

Civil No. 924902516DA

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

This case and action came on regularly for trial before
this Court on June 11, 1993. Plaintiff and his Attorney Walker E.
Anderson were present.

Defendant, Arlene Ann Metcalf was present

with her Attorney Laura L. Boyer.

The State

of Utah was

represented by Assistant Attorney General Karma K. Dixon.
Stipulations were made to the Court.

Some

Other issues were tried.

Testimony was taken. Some exhibits were received. Arguments were
heard. The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law now
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
Exhibit "A"

1.

Dennis Leon Metcalf and Arlene Ann Metcalf are granted a

Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore
existing between them which Decree is final upon entry.
2.

Arlene Ann Metcalf is awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of Steven Metcalf

(born April 5, 1978) and Jeremy

Metcalf (born December 1, 1980) subject to the following rights of
reasonable visitation periods and times by Dennis Leon Metcalf:
A»

Alternate Weekends from Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m.

B.

Alternate Wednesdays from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.

C.

Christmas Day from 1:00 p.m. through 1/2 of the childrens
total Christmas school vacation.

D.

Thanksgiving in even years beginning in 1994 from the day
before Thanksgiving at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

E.

Easter in odd years beginning in 1995 from Friday at 6:00
p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

F.

Alternate other major holidays from 6:00 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 6:00 p.m. on the holiday.

G»

Holiday

visitation

to

take

precedence

over

weekend

visitation, and no changes should be made to the regular
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule.
H*

Plaintiff should have Father's Day as appropriate from
6:00 p.m. the day before until 6:00 p.m. the day of.
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I.

Defendant should have Mother's Day as appropriate from
6:00 p.m. the day before until 6:00 p.m. the day of.

J.

Each child's birthday and Plaintiff's birthday one evening
during the week of the birthday from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30
p.m.

K.

Four (4) continuous weeks during the summer with written
notice of dates provided to the Defendant by May 1st with
the Defendant to have alternate weekends, holiday, and
phone visitation during that time.

L.

Two 2 week periods per year, with written notice of dates
to the Defendant at least 3 0 days prior to visitation with
the Defendant to have alternate weekends, holiday, and
phone visitation during that time.

M.

Each

parent

shall

be

allowed

two

weeks

per

year

uninterrupted possession of the childi n for purposes of
vacation, provided the same does not interfere with
holiday visitation per above, and each parent shall notify
the other in writing of such two week period at least 3 0
days in advance.
N.

Reasonable telephone visitation before 8:00 p.nu

O.

Other times as the parties may agree.

3.

Dennis Leon Metcalf shall continue to provide and maintain

his current group policy of major medical insurance available
3

through his employment for the benefit of Steven Metcalf and Jeremy
Metcalf until they reach the age of eighteen or emancipation.
A.
dental

Arlene Ann Metcalf shall pay all routine medical and
expenses,

including

routine

office

visits,

physical

examinations, and immunizations incurred for the 2 children.
B.

That any extraordinary medical expenses for the children

if not paid by the medical policy insurance coverage through Dennis
Metcalf*s employment, then the extraordinary medical expenses shall
be paid 68% by Dennis Metcalf and 32% by Arlene Metcalf.
4.

Mr. and Mrs. Metcalf are mutually restrained and ordered

not to bother, molest, harass, threaten or interfere with the other
at any time and place.
5»

Each party is ordered to assume and pay his or her own

debts incurred after the parties separation June 2, 1992 and hold
the other harmless therefrom.
6.

Mr. Metcalf is ordered to pay child support, commencing

July 1, 1993, for the parties two children in the total amount of
$4 02.56 per month to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box
45011, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145 unless the Office gives written
notice that payments should be sent elsewhere.
7.

That the State of Utah Office of Recovery Services will

prepare a NOTICE TO WITHHOLD, commencing July 1, 1993, under Part
IV Chapter 11, Title 62A, Utah Code as Amended, and serve Mr.
4

Metcalffs employer, Payroll Department, Central Valley Water, 800
West Central Valley Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, to withhold
$402.56 each month for child support.
8.

A Qualified Domestic Relations. Order shall issue as it

relates to the Central Valley Water Reclamation Facility retirement
plan of Mr. Metcalf with 50% of the value of the amount of the
retirement as of the date that the Decree is entered to Arlene Ann
Metcalf, which QDRO will be prepared by her attorney.
9.

Mr. Metcalf will continue to pay the loan amount borrowed

from the retirement plan, and hold Mrs. Metcalf harmless therefrom.
10. The home and real property located at 6028 W. Brass Place,
Kearns, Utah 84118 shall be immediately sold for a reasonable
offer.

If there is any equity remaining after the closing, it

shall be paid to Mrs. Metcalf.
remaining

after

the

If there

is any deficiency

closing, Mr. and Mrs. Metcalf

shall

be

responsible and liable equally to pay the deficiency.
11. Mr. Metcalf shall pay alimony to Mrs. Metcalf of $100.00
per month, in accord with Section 3 0-3-5.
12. Mr. and Mrs. Metcalf shall work out an agreement for their
individual financial benefits regarding the two tax exemptions of
the children.
13. Each party shall pay their own costs and attorney fees.
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14. Each party shall sign and deliver any and all documents
necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of the Decree and
Judgment*
15. Mr. Metcalf is awarded the following described personal
property in his control and possession:
Truck,

Lawn

Mower, Camera,

1/2

Trailer, 1965 G.T.O.,

Albums, 1/2

Cassettes, Movie

Cassettes, C.D.'s, Entertainment Center, T.V. w/ remote, Stereo
Receiver, Cassette Deck, V.C.R., C D .

Player, Porcelain Doll,

Tiffany Lamp, 4 Speakers, and Rotweiler (female).

Mr. Metcalf

shall immediately pick up from Mrs. Metcalf the motor equipment in
the basement of the house.
16. Mrs. Metcalf is awarded the following described personal
property in her control and possession:

Gas Barbecue, 1985 Monte

Carlo, Sofa, T.V. w/ remote, V.C.R., Kitchen set, 2 Bar Stools,
Microwave, Refrigerator, Bedroom Set, Washer & Dryer, 1/2 Albums,
1/2 Cassettes, Table Lamp, End Tables, House Decor, Linen, Kitchen
Ware, and Phone. Mr. Metcalf shall have the Gas Barbecue delivered
to Mrs. Metcalf.
17. That Plaintiff is ordered to maintain hZs current life
Insurance policy naming the minor children of t#e parties as sole,
.rrevocable beneficiaries thereof.
DATgD^this?^/^^ day of
l V^&r$i(fyfi.JRip

IS A liRlJS? rr:

/ -

Approved as to form:

A t t o r n e y fory Mrs. i l e t c a l f
*1CA£MA K. DIXON, f o r Sta"
a t e of Utah
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned certifies that true and correct cop- of the DEFENDANT'S APPEAL
BRIEF w

sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, this £>/f7day of October, 1993, to the

following:
Walker E. Anderson, Esq.
Mountain America Credit Union
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
KARMA DIXON, Esq.
Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 45011
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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